Education Vouchers: Means Testing Versus Uniformity by John Creedy
  ISSN  0819-2642 







THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 





Education Vouchers: Means  







   
Department of Economics 
The University of Melbourne  
Melbourne      Victoria     3010 
Australia. 
 Education Vouchers: Means Testing versus
Uniformity
John Creedy∗
The University of Melbourne
Abstract
This paper compares a uniform education voucher system with a
means-tested scheme in which the voucher is subject to a taper or
withdrawal rate as parental gross income increases. Parents are as-
sumed to maximise a utility function which includes their consump-
tion, leisure and the human capital of children. The human capital
production function has inputs consisting of parental human capital
and expenditure on education. The government faces a budget con-
straint such that the voucher and a social dividend are ﬁnanced from
a proportional income tax. Alternative combinations of voucher and
tax and transfer schemes are evaluated using a social welfare func-
tion deﬁned in terms of the utility of parents. It is found that for all
combinations of policy variables, a uniform voucher turns out to be
optimal. However, if a binding constraint is placed on the maximum
tax rate, means-testing, with a low taper, is found to be optimal.
∗I should like to thank Thor Thoreson for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to compare a uniform education voucher system
with a means-tested scheme in which the voucher is reduced as parental
gross income increases. Means-testing is usually advocated on the grounds
that transfer payments should be designed to help the poor, so that univer-
sal beneﬁts are wasteful and involve an excessive level of gross government
revenue; that is, they are said to have low ‘target eﬃciency’.1 However, such
a measure reﬂects only one characteristic of transfers. Alternative voucher
schemes are evaluated here in terms of a social welfare function, in the con-
text of a model allowing for the incentive eﬀects, on both labour supply and
educational choices, of a tax and transfer system combined with vouchers.
The incentive eﬀects are complicated by the highly nonlinear nature of the
budget constraints facing parents, and play an important role in the analysis.
The analysis presented here therefore diﬀers from a number of earlier
studies of alternative voucher schemes, which have largely been concerned
with examining majority voting outcomes. Thus they have had to deal with
the complexities arising from the existence of double-peaked preferences.2
Emphasis has been placed on the analysis of education in the context of en-
dogenous growth models, with an interest not only in the resulting growth
implications but in the evolution of inequality over time. These analyses gen-
erally consider sequential voting over diﬀerent parts of the tax and voucher
system (and do not include other types of transfer payment).
The present analysis is not directly concerned with growth but ﬁts more
closely into the optimal tax tradition, where a social welfare function is max-
1Studies of target eﬀeciency typically follow the inﬂuential study by Beckerman (1979).
For broad discussions of means-testing versus universal beneﬁts, see Mitchell, Harding and
Gruen (1994), Atkinson (1995) and Creedy (1995, 1996), although these studies do not
examine education vouchers.
2Much of this literature was stimulated by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and includes,
for example, Cardak (1999, 2004), Bearse et al. (2000, 2004), Caucutt (2004) and Fer-
nandes and Rogerson (2001). More detailed comparisons are made below. There are of
course many issues relating to the use and design of voucher systems, which do not involve
the types of model discussed here. For reviews of issues, see West (1997) and Cardak
and Hone (2003). A critical review is by Ladd (2002). There is also a literature on the
geographical mobility eﬀect of vouchers; see for example, Nechyba (1999).
2imised, involving a multi-dimensional search over policy variables. These
include the income tax rate, the voucher taper (or withdrawal) rate, the
maximum voucher and the social dividend, where a degree of freedom in
those choices is lost because of the government’s budget constraint.
The framework of analysis is described in section 2. Parents are assumed
to maximise a utility function which includes their consumption, leisure and
the human capital of children, where the latter is generated from a human
capital production function with inputs consisting of parental human capital
and expenditure on education. The expenditure on education is constrained
to be at least as large as the maximum value of the voucher available. Par-
ents diﬀer both in their own human capital and their preferences regarding
the education of children. The voucher, along with a social dividend and any
other non-transfer government expenditure required, is ﬁnanced from a pro-
portional income tax within a pay-as-you-go system involving the generation
of parents. Means testing introduces considerable complexities in consump-
tion, education expenditure and labour supply decisions of parents, because
of the non-convexities of the resulting budget constraints facing parents.
Section 3 applies this framework to the case of a uniform, or uncondi-
tional, education voucher system. The complications arising from means-
testing are examined in section 4. The complexities of individual consump-
tion, education expenditure and labour supply behaviour, combined with
the nonlinearity of the government’s budget constraint, mean that numerical
iterative methods must be used to solve the model. A range of numerical
analyses are presented in section 5. Alternative combinations of voucher and
tax and transfer schemes are evaluated using a standard social welfare func-
tion deﬁned in terms of the utility of parents, and including an aversion to
inequality. The approach is therefore an extension of the type of model used
in the optimal tax literature. The alternatives examined include the special
situation in which means-testing is preferred, arising from a constraint on
the income tax rate. Brief conclusions are in section 6.
32T h e F r a m e w o r k o f A n a l y s i s
This section describes the basic model. The utility functions and human
capital production function are set out in subsection 2.1. The tax and transfer
system is then described in subsection 2.2.
2.1 Utility Functions
In the following analysis, in order to avoid problems associated with joint util-
ity maximisation and labour supply decisions, parents are essentially treated
as a single individual. The population is made up entirely of such parents,
with each person having a single child. The subscript, t, refers to the genera-
tion of parents while the subscript, t+1, refers to the generation of children.
Each parent has endowments of time, normalised to unity, and human capital,
denoted by hi,t for parent i. In the present context human capital actually
reﬂects the productivity, or wage rate, of an individual. Earnings are the
only source of income, other than government transfer payments.
Each parent is assumed to derive utility from its own consumption and
leisure, and from the human capital of the child. Let Ci,t denote the consump-
tion of the ith parent, where the price is normalised to unity. The leisure
o ft h ep a r e n ti sd e n o t e dLi,t, and the human capital of the child is denoted
hi,t+1. The utility function of the parent is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas,
expressed for convenience in logarithmic form, so that:3
Ui,t = θlogCi,t + αloghi,t+1 +( 1− θ − α)logLi,t (1)
For convenience, no subscripts have been placed on the parameters. However,
in section 5, the speciﬁcation is extended to allow for a joint distribution of
α and ht.
3This is similar to the form used by Preston (2003), except that here there is a non-unit
coeﬃcient on C. In Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) it is ‘schooling quality’ which enters U,
not the human capital of the child; furthermore, the child is assumed to make a decision
regarding the choice of work and time spent in education, and the adult has ﬁxed labour
supply. Cardak (1999, 2004) uses a similar model to that of Glomm and Ravikumar. In
Bearse et al. (2000) there are no labour supply choices. Fernandez and Rogerson (2001)
have a utility function including consumption and the expected value of next period’s
income of the child, with no labour supply variations.
4The child’s human capital results from a production function involving
the parent’s human capital and expenditure, made entirely by the parent,
devoted to the education of the child. Deﬁne Ei,t as education expenditure,
and hi,t is the human capital of the parent. The human capital production






with δ>1. Hence hi,t+1 is proportional to a weighted geometric mean of
expenditure on education and the parent’s human capital.
Substituting (2) into (1) gives:
Ui,t = k + θlogCi,t + αγ logEi,t +( 1− θ − α)logLi,t (3)
where k = α{logδ +( 1− γ)loghi,t}.
2.2 Taxes and Transfers
Suppose there is an unconditional transfer payment of b per parent.5 In
addition, a non-transferable education voucher, worth Vi,t, is available to the
parent. Each parent may supplement the voucher by spending an additional
amount, Si,t, on the child’s education. Hence expenditure is given by:
Ei,t = Vi,t + Si,t (4)
Clearly, Si,t = 0, so the restriction, Ei,t = Vi,t must hold — otherwise the
voucher is equivalent to a transfer payment which can be used by the parent
to ﬁnance its own consumption.
Suppose that the voucher and unconditional transfer system is ﬁnanced
by a proportional tax on the earnings of parents at the rate, τ. Gross earnings
4This is the form used by Preston (2003), except for the addition of the eﬃciency term
δ. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) have an additional term to allow for the proportion of
time spent in education of the child.
5The models in Preston (2003), Cardak (1999, 2004), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992),
Bearse et al. (2000) and Bearse et al. (2003) have no transfer payments in addition to
the voucher. This means that all individuals work (since there are no other sources of
income), and in means-tested systems, those not eligible for a voucher have ﬁxed labour
supplies (with Cobb-Douglas preferences).
5are denoted Y G
i,t,s ot h a t :
Y
G
i,t = hi,t (1 − Li,t) (5)
Net income, Y N
i,t ,f r o me a r n i n g sa n dt h et r a n s f e rp a y m e n t ,i sg i v e nb y :
Y
N
i,t = hi,t (1 − Li,t)(1− τ)+b (6)
T h ep a r e n t ’ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti st h u s :
hi,t (1 − Li,t)(1− τ)+b + Vi,t = Ci,t + Ei,t (7)
It is assumed that transfers and vouchers are ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-
go basis for each generation of parents. With n parents, total income tax
revenue is equal to τ
Pn
i Y G
i,t. The total cost of the voucher system is
Pn
i Vi,t
and the total cost of the unconditional transfer is nb. Hence the government’s













= V + b (9)
where Y
G
and V are average earnings and average voucher received by par-







,s ot h a tt h et a xr a t ei se q u a lt ot h er a t i oo fb e n e ﬁts
per person to average earnings, is nevertheless deceptive. In fact, it is highly
nonlinear in view of the dependence of earnings on the tax and transfer pa-
rameters. This is shown in the following sections, which consider alternative
voucher arrangements.
3 A Uniform Voucher
Suppose there is an unconditional uniform voucher system, so that:
Vi,t = V (10)
6There is thus a pay-as-you-go system, involving the generation of parents, for the
ﬁnance of vouchers and beneﬁts. The possibility of tax smoothing is not examined here.
6The full income of the parent, Mi,t, is therefore given by:
Mi,t = hi,t (1 − τ)+b + V (11)
The parent’s problem is to select Ei,t, Ci,t and Li,t to maximise utility,
given by (3) subject to the budget constraint. Since the eﬀective price of
leisure per unit is the net wage, hi,t (1 − τ), the budget constraint in (7)
above can be rewritten as:
Ci,t + Ei,t + hi,t (1 − τ)Li,t = Mi,t (12)
There are the additional constraints that Ei,t = V and Li,t 5 1.T h em o s t
convenient way to consider this optimisation problem is ﬁrst to examine
interior, or tangency, solutions and then to examine whether the inequality
constraints are satisﬁed.






with 1+α(γ − 1) equal to the sum of the coeﬃcients on (the logarithms of)





And the demand for leisure is equal to:
Li,t =
µ




hi,t (1 − τ)
=
µ





hi,t (1 − τ)
¾
(15)
since hi,t (1 − τ) is the price of leisure.
These results hold only when the inequality constraints, Ei,t = V and
Li,t 5 1,a r es a t i s ﬁed. Attention needs to be given to possible corner so-
lutions. From (14), the parent spends more on education than the voucher
7For Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the demand for any good is expressed as the
product of two terms. The ﬁrst is the ratio of the exponent on the good to the sum of all









































































































































































Figure 2: Labour Supply with Uniform Voucher










If hi,t <h E, it is necessary to set Ei,t = V . As a consequence of this,
consumption and leisure are determined by maximising:
Ui,t = k
0 + θlogCi,t +( 1− θ − α)logLi,t (17)
where k0 = α
©
logδ +( 1− γ)loghi,t + γ logV
ª
. Applying the standard Cobb-














hi,t (1 − τ)
¶
(19)
Finally, from (19), the parent works if human capital (the wage rate) exceeds










9For those with hi,t <h W,t h e nLi,t =1 ,E i,t = V and Ci,t = b.
These results show that the relationships between human capital and
expenditure on education and consumption take the form of piecewise-linear
schedules; Cobb-Douglas utility functions imply that both Ei,t and Ci,t are
linear functions of hi,t, between relevant ranges.8 The typical forms are shown
in Figure 1. Consumption and education expenditure are respectively b and
V ,w h e nhi,t <h W and the parent does not work. Beyond hW consumption
jumps to a higher level, associated with the jump in labour supply shown
in Figure 2. A feature of the model is that there is not a smooth transition
into work, and this is caused by the fact that the non-transferable education
voucher implies that individuals must, over a range of relatively low values of
h,e ﬀectively spend more of their net income on education than they would
otherwise spend. As shown in the lower segment of Figure 1, education
expenditure does not exceed V until hi,t >h E >h W. The discontinuity
in the labour supply from non-work to work depends (in part) on the size
of unconditional transfer payment relative to the education voucher, which
prescribes the minimum education expenditure. A higher value of b means
that the threshold value, hW, is higher, but the initial work hours are lower.9
Furthermore, the higher b also means that the threshold hE is lower, so that
education expenditure exceeds the ﬁxed voucher level over a wider range of
parent’s human capital.
4 A Means-tested Voucher
Suppose the voucher is means-tested and subject to a taper rate of β.T h e
maximum voucher, received by those who do not work, is V ∗ and the voucher
8On Cobb-Douglas properties in basic optimal tax/transfer models, see Creedy (1996).
9Even where b>V,there is a discrete jump on entry into work, so long as desired
education expenditure is lower than V .
10received by the ith parent, Vi,t,i sg i v e nb y : 10








As above, Y G
i,t = hi,t (1 − Li,t) is the gross earnings of the ith parent. Those
with Y G
i,t = V ∗/β receive no voucher and must fully fund their child’s ed-
ucation from post-tax earnings. However, the constraint is imposed on all
parents that they must spend at least V ∗ on education. The non-convexity in
the budget set, introduced by means testing, complicates the labour supply
and consumption behaviour of individuals in two ways. First, there can be
multiple local optima, with one being at a corner solution involving no labour
supply and the other being a tangency position where no voucher is obtained.
There can also be simultaneous tangency positions on both segments of the
budget constraint, along the same indiﬀerence curve. Secondly there can be
discrete jumps in labour supply when a small change in the net wage causes
an individual to move between segments of the budget constraint. The crit-
ical net wage is that giving rise to the two tangency position along a single
indiﬀerence curve.
This section presents the analytics of means-tested vouchers. Subsections
4.1 and 4.2 examine consumption and labour supply for those eligible to
receive the voucher and those who exhaust their entitlement, respectively.
Subsection 4.3 considers the possible proﬁles which can arise from such a
system.
4.1 Voucher Recipients
For those who are eligible for a means-tested voucher, the budget constraint
is:
hi,t (1 − Li,t)(1− τ)+b + V
∗ − βhi,t (1 − Li,t)=Ci,t + Ei,t (22)
10This is the standard form of means-testing for transfer payments. Means testing is
not considered by Preston (2003) or Cardak (1999, 2004). Fernandez and Rogerson (2001)
consider two alternative types of means-testing. First, those below a threshold are given a
ﬁxed voucher, while those above the threshold receive no voucher. Second, those below the
threshold receive a voucher depending on their income and the amount spent on education.
11which can be rearranged as:
Li,thi,t (1 − τ − β)+Ci,t + Ei,t = hi,t (1 − τ − β)+b + V
∗
= Mi,t (23)
Hence for this group, the constraint looks exactly like the universal grant
budget constraint except that the eﬀective income tax rate is τ + β rather
than simply τ. Grant recipients therefore face a higher eﬀective tax rate than
those who have Y G
i,t = V ∗/β. This gross earnings threshold translates into a
threshold in terms of labour supply, 1−Li,t,o fV ∗/βhi,t. Hence this range of
the budget set can be ruled out immediately if it results in Li,t < 1−V ∗/βhi,t.
As in the case of a uniform voucher, a check must be made to ensure that
the resulting value of Ei,t is at least V ∗. If the constraint does not hold, the
a p p r o p r i a t ea d j u s t m e n tm u s tb em a d e ,f o l l o w i n ge x a c t l yt h es a m ep r o c e d u r e
as described in the previous section. As before, those who do not work receive
the full voucher of V ∗, and consume the universal transfer of b. However,
if this corner solution applies to an individual parent, it may be only one
local optimum. It is necessary to check the possibility that the parent may
be better oﬀ by working relatively long hours and paying the lower marginal
tax rate, while receiving no voucher.
4.2 Voucher Non-recipients
Those who have exhausted their beneﬁt entitlement face a budget constraint
of:
hi,t (1 − Li,t)(1− τ)+b = Ci,t + Ei,t (24)
In terms of full income, Mi,t,t h i st r a n s l a t e st o :
Li,thi,t (1 − τ)+Ci,t + Ei,t = hi,t (1 − τ)+b
= Mi,t (25)
With this modiﬁcation, the results for consumption, education expendi-
ture and leisure in equations (13), (14) and (15) apply simply by setting
V =0 .11 Any tangency solution giving rise to gross earnings, below the
11If there were no transfer payment, the labour supply of non-recipients would be con-
stant and independent of the income tax rate, τ.
12threshold above which the voucher is exhausted, must of course be ruled out
as infeasible.













If individuals are constrained to set Ei,t = V ∗, an adjustment must be
made to the values of leisure and consumption, again following the approach
discussed in the previous section. It is possible that this adjustment rules
out this range of hours worked where no voucher is received, that is if the
resulting Li,t is greater than 1 − V ∗/βhi,t.
4.3 Possible Proﬁles
A possible relationship between the gross wage rate (human capital) and
consumption is shown in Figure 3. This is similar to that shown in Figure 1
except that there is an additional range above hE. For a wage rate of hS,a
small increase causes the individual to jump from working and receiving a
means-tested voucher to a higher labour supply where no voucher is received.
Figure 3 shows a situation in which the individual is voluntarily spending
more on education than the maximum voucher, while continuing to receive
a reduced (means-tested) voucher.
However, it is possible that the consumption proﬁle could take alternative
forms. Two possibilities are shown in Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4, all those
receiving a means-tested voucher are constrained by the need to spend more
on education than they would otherwise wish, and some of those who exhaust
their entitlement to the voucher face a similar binding constraint. Figure 5
illustrates the situation in which the taper rate is so high that it is never
optimal to work and receive a voucher, but some of the workers face the
binding constraint whereby Ei,t is set equal to V ∗. Yet another possibility,





























































































Figure 5: Consumption with Means-tested Voucher: Alternative Proﬁle
5N u m e r i c a l A n a l y s e s
In view of the nonlinearity of the model, further results require the use of
numerical simulation methods. This section reports a number of analyses
designed to obtain the optimal values of the four policy variables τ, β, V ∗
and b. The simulation procedure is described in subsection 5.1. In order to
interpret the results, it is useful to consider alternative proﬁles of consump-
tion and other expenditure as human capital (the wage rate) varies; these
are discussed in subsection 5.2. Variations in the income tax rate, for given
values of the other parameters, are examined in subsection 5.3. Optimal
rates are ﬁnally discussed in subsection 5.4.
5.1 Simulation Procedure
In simulating a population it is ﬁrst necessary to specify the nature of popu-
lation heterogeneity. In optimal tax models it is usual simply to assume that
preferences are identical and only wage rates diﬀer. However, suppose par-
ents’ preferences regarding the human capital of children, determined by the
15parameter α of the utility function, are correlated with human capital, hi,t.12
This can be modelled by specifying a joint distribution of h and α. Drop-











A simulated population may be obtained as follows. First, select a ran-
dom observation from the marginal distribution of h. If vi is a random vari-
able drawn from an N (0,1) distribution, the corresponding value of the ith
parent’s human capital, hi, is obtained as:
hi =e x p( μh + viσh) (28)
A corresponding value of αi is obtained from the conditional distribution of
α,g i v e nh.L e tui denote another random draw from an N (0,1) distribution.
Then:











It is assumed that individuals share a common value of θ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on
consumption in the utility function. Preferences for leisure also vary, since
the coeﬃcient is obtained as 1 − θ − αi.
In the following simulations, it is assumed that μh =1 0and σ2
h =0 .5.I n
addition, a minimum value of hi of 2000 is imposed. A simulated population
of 5000 parents is used. In the majority of cases presented, it is assumed that
σα =0 .02,a n dρ =0 .5, so that there is a tendency for those parents with
relatively high human capital to have a higher preference for increasing that
of their children. It is most convenient to specify the arithmetic mean value,
α, and then to determine the appropriate value of μα using:






Results are given for a range of values of the parameter, γ,i nt h eh u -
man capital production function. The consumption, education expenditure
12Heterogeneous preferences in education models were introduced by Cardak (1999).
Preston (2003) assumed a uniform distribution of α.
16and leisure choices of parents are independent of the parameter δ,s of o r
c o n v e n i e n c et h i si ss e ta t2.6 in all cases presented below.13
Having produced a population of parents, the aim is to determine opti-
mal values of the policy variables. These are the two tax rates, τ and β,
and the two transfer levels, V ∗ and b.14 But one degree of freedom is lost
because of the government budget constraint in equation (9) above. Hence,
a search over three dimensions is needed. The approach is as follows. For
each combination of voucher parameters examined, β and V ∗,ar a n g eo ft a x
rates τ is considered, where of course the restriction β + τ<1 must limit
the upper value of the income tax rate in the range. In addition, a minimum
value of τ applies, given the need to ﬁnance the voucher system.
For each value of τ, the government budget constraint is solved iteratively
to produce the corresponding value of the unconditional transfer payment, b.
At r i a lv a l u eo fb,s a yb0, is used to examine each parent’s choices, and hence
the corresponding values of Y
G
and V are computed. Then the resulting




If b1 >b 0, the trial value is increased slightly, or if b1 <b 0 the trial value
is reduced, and another iteration is carried out until convergence is reached.
It would not of course be appropriate to try to solve the budget constraint
for τ, given a value of the transfer payment, b, because it is possible to have
two diﬀerent tax rates corresponding to any transfer level: holding other
parameters constant, the feasible value of b ﬁrst increases and then falls as
τ is increased. However, the restriction on the range of τ,d e t e r m i n e db y
the assumed value of β, means that b does not fall in all cases; examples are
shown below.
The alternative tax structures can be evaluated using a social welfare
function, which reﬂects the value judgements of an independent judge or hy-
pothetical policy maker. Following the standard approach used in the optimal
13This value is of course relevant in a growth context. In addition, given the form of the
constant, k, in the utility function, it aﬀects the absolute value of utility. This constant
term diﬀers among parents given the variability in α.
14If β =0 ,t h e nV = V ∗.










where ε is the constant relative inequality aversion parameter of the judge.
5.2 Individual Proﬁles
Examples of labour supply and expenditure proﬁles are shown in Figures 6 to
9. In each case θ =0 .45, α =0 .35 and γ =0 .6. The only diﬀerence between
Figures 6 and 7 is that in the former the taper rate β is equal to 0.1 while in
the latter it is increased to 0.3.T h eﬁgures clearly show the extent to which
the lower taper implies that a positive voucher is received over a wider range
of the wage rate (the human capital of the parent). Furthermore, education
expenditure exceeds the minimum required (determined by the maximum
voucher V ∗) over a slightly wider range, and parents work over a wider range
of h. For the lower taper in Figure 6, the relevant wage thresholds are
hW =2 3 0 0 , hE =3 8 0 0and hS =2 7 ,800. For the higher taper in Figure 8,
t h er e l e v a n tw a g et h r e s h o l d sa r ehW =3 3 0 0 , hE =5 3 0 0and hS =1 0 ,800;a
larger number of parents receive no voucher at all.
Figure 8 illustrates proﬁles for higher levels of the unconditional transfer
and the maximum voucher, and of the tax rates. In this case, all individuals
below hW =7 0 0 0do not work, and human capital must reach hE = hS =
17000 until the level of education expenditure exceeds the minimum required
a m o u n t :t h i sa r i s e sa f t e rt h ed i s c r e t ej u m pt a k e sp l a c eo n t ot h er a n g ew h e r e
no voucher is received. Finally, Figure 9 has a relatively high unconditional
transfer, ﬁnanced by a higher income tax rate, but there is a uniform voucher
(β =0 ). Here education expenditure exceeds the universal voucher of 2800
when hi,t >h E =5 7 0 0 .
5.3 Variations in the Income Tax Rate
An indication of the eﬀect of varying the income tax rate, for given values of











































































Figure 6: Labour Supply and Expenditure Proﬁles: V = 2000; b =3 5 0 0 ;











































































Figure 7: Labour Supply and Expenditure Proﬁles: V = 2000; b =3 5 0 0 ;







































































Figure 8: Labour Supply and Expenditure Proﬁles: V = 3000; b =4 0 0 0 ;


















































Figure 9: Labour Supply and Expenditure Proﬁles: V = 2800; b =5 5 0 0 ;
β =0 ; τ =0 .45
22α =0 .35,σ 2
α =0 .02, γ =0 .6. Social welfare is evaluated using an inequality
aversion of ε =0 .5. The diﬀerence in the two sets of diagrams is the maximum
voucher level, set at 2000 and 5000 in Figures 10 and 11 respectively, and
results are shown in each case for two taper rates.
F o rt h el o w e rv a l u eo fV ∗ =2 0 0 0 , the higher taper rate allows a slightly
higher transfer payment to be ﬁnanced, for a given value of τ, though the
range of income tax rates is substantially restricted with the higher taper
rate. The resulting social welfare is higher with the lower taper, for a given
income tax rate. For the case where V ∗ =5 0 0 0 , the proﬁles in Figure 11 are
slightly diﬀerent. The minimum value of τ must be higher with the lower
taper rate, because the greater generosity of the voucher system means that
insuﬃcient revenue is obtained unless the tax rate is suﬃciently high. The
proﬁles of both b and W are somewhat diﬀerent in this case, as they have a
kink in them at a tax rate of around 0.34.I n t h e c a s e o f t h e b proﬁle, the
transfer payment can actually be higher for a high taper rate compared with
al o wt a p e r .
These results are explained by the behaviour of labour supply in the two
ranges of the income tax rate. For example, with preferences of θ =0 .45 and
α =0 .35, and tax parameters V ∗ =5 0 0 0 , b = 3500,τ=0 .3 and β =0 .5,
the three wage (or human capital) thresholds are hW =1 2 ,800, hS =1 7 ,400
and hE = 24300. Hence as the wage increases, individuals begin to work
and receive a means tested beneﬁt, then jump to the range of the budget
constraint where no beneﬁt is received, while continuing to spend only the
minimum amount (of 5000) on education, until a wage of 24300 is reached.
H o w e v e r ,w i t ht h es a m ep a r a m e t e r se x c e p tt h a tb =3 8 0 0and τ =0 .38,
individuals jump directly from not working (and receiving the full voucher)
to the segment of the budget constraint where no voucher is received; that is,
hW = hS = 18700.15 The simulations have a distribution of the parameter α,
as explained above, but over the higher income tax rates the small number
of people receiving a reduced voucher allows the unconditional transfer to be
higher with a high taper than with the low taper rate. However, Figure 11
shows that social welfare is unambiguously higher, for given income tax rate,









































































































































































































































Figure 11: Social Welfare and Transfer Payment: V = 5000
25with the lower taper rate.
5.4 Optimal Tax Rates
The examples reported in the previous subsection have shown that, in these
cases, social welfare is unambiguously higher with the lower taper rates, for
given values of τ. But of course, depending on the choice of all the tax
parameters, it is quite possible to achieve higher social welfare with a higher
t a p e rr a t e .F o re x a m p l e ,w h e r eV ∗ =2 0 0 0 ,s o c i a lw e l f a r ei sh i g h e rw i t ht h e
combination of β =0 .5 with τ =0 .2, than when β =0 .1 and τ =0 .2.
This subsection considers the optimal combination of the four tax para-
meters. This is achieved by carrying out a grid search over three dimensions,
V ∗, β and τ, where in each case the value of b is determined by solving (it-
eratively) the government budget constraint. At each iteration the optimal
consumption, labour supply and education expenditure decisions of each of
the 5000 simulated parents, as described above, are computed. For each of






1−ε , are evaluated. The major result is that for all
preference and human capital production function parameters examined, the
optimal value of β was found to be zero; that is, the optimal voucher system
is one involving an unconditional voucher.
The sensitivity of results to parameter values is shown in Table 1. Case
B, in the ﬁrst substantive row of the table, refers to the ‘base’ case used, and
variations in the parameters are shown in the following rows: a space indicates
t h a tt h ep r e v i o u sv a l u e( i nt h er o wa b o v et h er e l e v a n tr o w )a p p l i e s .T h eo t h e r
parameters are μh =1 0 .0, σ2
h =0 .5, ρ =0 .5 and σα =0 .02.16 Consider ﬁrst
the optimal values shown in the three columns headed ‘Full Model’. The
optimal tax rates reported here are higher than those generally found in the
optimal tax literature involving tax-transfer systems. This clearly results
from the productivity of education expenditure, when combined with the
16A positive correlation, ρ, seems the most sensible assumption, although some sensi-
tivity results are reported below. It was also found that there is little eﬀect of increasing
the value of σα.
26Table 1: Optimal Policy Variables for Alternative Parameter Values
Full model b =0
Case θ αγ ε τV ∗ bτ V ∗
B0 . 4 50 . 3 50 . 60 . 50 . 4 72 8 0 05 6 7 4 0 . 2 44 9 1 4
1 0.1 0.46 2800 5550 0.24 4914
2 1.5 0.48 2700 5895 0.22 4252
3 3.0 0.50 2800 6026 0.22 4252
4 0 . 40 . 50 . 4 61 9 0 06 1 0 0 0 . 1 93 8 3 5
5 0.5 0.46 2300 5886 0.22 4470
6 0.7 0.47 3500 5134 0.28 5749
7 0.8 0.47 3600 5178 0.30 6196
8 0.30 0.6 0.44 2100 5196 0.20 3821
90 . 4 00 . 3 5 0 . 4 52 5 0 04 8 1 2 0 . 2 54 6 4 2
10 0.30 0.43 2000 4392 0.22 3795
11 0.35 0.45 0.46 3800 4373 0.29 5715
Notes: μh =1 0 .0; σ2
h =0 .5; ρ =0 .5; σα =0 .02
parental human capital.17 The optimal unconditional transfer payment, or
social dividend, is higher than the maximum voucher level, though obviously
many parents voluntarily invest more than V ∗ in education.
The optimal tax rate and transfer levels show very little sensitivity to
the degree of inequality aversion of the social welfare function. Furthermore,
a higher aversion involves a higher optimal social dividend, with very little
eﬀect on the voucher. Similarly, the parameter γ of the human capital pro-
duction function has very little eﬀect on the optimal tax rate, but does lead
to a higher optimal voucher.
The ‘redistributive’ element involved in having a voucher in a progressive
tax-transfer structure is to some extent reduced by the assumed positive
correlation between parents’ human capital and their preference for childrens’
human capital. For the ‘base case’ a correlation coeﬃcient of ρ = −0.5
produces a slightly higher optimal voucher of V ∗ =3 2 0 0 ,w i t hb reduced
to 5096 and τ =0 .46. The negative correlation means that, on average,
17The investment obviously increases the tax base for the next generation, but this eﬀect
is not allowed for here because the welfare function is deﬁned over parents’ utilities in one
generation only, and pay-as-you-go ﬁnancing of transfers and vouchers applies.
27α is higher for those with lower h, and given the positive skewness in the
distribution of h, it is not surprising that the eﬀect of moving from a positive
to a negative correlation is similar to that of increasing α.
The last two columns of Table 1 showing optimal combinations of τ and
V ∗ for the case where there is no social transfer, so that b is set equal to
zero in all cases. In this situation, all individuals work and with means-
testing those who are no longer eligible for the voucher have an optimal
labour supply that is independent of their net wage, and hence income tax
rate. Here, the search for an optimal combination was carried out over two
dimensions, by varying τ and β, while for each combination solving iteratively
for the value of V ∗ which satisﬁe st h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t .A g a i n ,
a non-means-tested voucher turned out to be optimal for all combinations.
In this situation, a higher degree of inequality aversion involves a very small
reduction in the optimal tax rate: the education voucher system is not acting
as a redistributive device.18
The approach used, of maximising a social welfare function deﬁned in
terms of individuals’ utilities, allows the value of V ∗ to be determined simul-
taneously with other tax parameters. An alternative approach may take the
view that an independent decision maker or social planner would have par-
ticular views about the minimum level of education expenditure per person.
The social planner may, for example, take into account externality eﬀects of
investment in education (and possibly also consider later generations). How-
ever, if the voucher is exogenously set at a level above the values that are
found to be optimal in Table 1, and a search is carried out over values of
β and τ, while solving the government budget constraint for b, a universal
voucher continues to be optimal (with β =0 ). Furthermore, higher imposed
values of V ∗ have very little eﬀect on the optimal tax rate, with the main
eﬀect being a reduction in the social dividend.19
The model described above involves a ‘pure’ tax and transfer system in
18Using the ‘base case’ parameters, a change to ρ = −0.5 with ε =3 .0 produces only a
small increase in the value of V ∗ to 3000,w i t hb = 5536 and τ =0 .48.
19For example, for the ‘base case’ parameters, if V ∗ = 4000 the optimal values of τ and
β are respectively 0.47 and 4513.Ah i g h e rv a l u eo fV ∗ of 6000 results in optimal τ and β
of 0.50 and 3100 respectively.
28Table 2: Optimal Values with Non-transfer Expenditure
Non-transfer
expenditure τV ∗ b
1000 0.48 2671 5100
3000 0.50 2286 4100
5000 0.53 1968 3200
7000 0.56 1594 2400
Table 3: Optimal Values with Restricted Income Tax Rate
Restricted τβ V ∗ b
0.15 0.14 3600 1675
0.20 0.13 3600 2478
0.25 0.12 3700 3140
0.30 0.10 3600 3808
0.35 0.08 3300 4593
which there is no government revenue allocated to non-transfer (including
voucher) expenditure which has no eﬀect on individuals’ utilities. The in-
troduction of such non-transfer government revenue, which has been found
to be signiﬁcant in the standard optimal tax literature, is easily carried out
since it involves only a modiﬁcation to the government’s budget constraint.
For the ‘base’ parameters described in Table 1, examples of the inﬂuence of
alternative levels of non-transfer expenditure are reported in Table 2. Again,
β =0is optimal in all cases. Table 2 shows that the transfer payment, b,i s
much more sensitive to the introduction of non-transfer expenditure than is
the voucher.
In obtaining the optimal combination of policy variables, no constraints
have been placed on the range of possible values. It might be argued that if
there are exogenous constraints on the income tax rate, and hence the gross
revenue which can be raised, the case for targeting the voucher is stronger.
I n d e e d ,i ti sa ne m p h a s i so ng r o s sr e v e n u ei nal i n e a r ,o rﬂat-tax, system
which usually lies behind arguments for means-testing (though of course this
is to a large extent arbitrary, since gross revenue is simply reduced if the
system is administered by paying only net transfers and collecting only net
29income tax). Table 3 reports, again for the ‘base case’, optimal values of the
other policy variables if the income tax rate is restricted to a value below
the corresponding value shown in Table 1. The restriction in the income tax
rate has very little eﬀect on the optimal value of V ∗,w i t ht h eb u r d e no ft h e
constraint falling on the reduction in b. The restriction in the income tax
revenue which can be collected does indeed mean that the optimal voucher
system involves means testing. However, even with a very low τ,t h et a p e r
rate is low.20
6 Conclusions
This paper has compared a uniform education voucher system with a means-
tested scheme in which the voucher is subject to a taper or withdrawal rate as
parental gross income increases. The model is one in which parents maximise
a utility function which includes their consumption, leisure and the human
capital of children. There is a human capital production function with inputs
consisting of parental human capital and expenditure on education. The
expenditure on education by each parent is constrained to be at least as
large as the maximum value of the voucher available. Parents diﬀer both
in their own human capital and their preferences regarding the education of
children.
In examining the choice of consumption, education expenditure and leisure,
it was necessary to pay close attention to the complexities introduced by in-
equality constraints and non-convexities in the budget set of parents. The
government faces a budget constraint such that the voucher and a social
dividend are ﬁnanced from a proportional income tax, within a pay-as-you-
go system involving the generation of parents. Alternative combinations of
voucher and tax and transfer schemes were evaluated using a standard social
welfare function deﬁned in terms of the utility of parents, and including an
aversion to inequality.
20Indeed, restricting V ∗ to be above the unconstrained socially optimal value, and con-
straining the income tax rate, such that V ∗ =5 5 0 0and τ =0 .35, produces an optimal β
of only 0.12.H e r eβ is eﬀectively the only policy instrument over which there is freedom
to choose, since b is determined to satisfy the government budget constraint.
30Numerical methods were used to compare social welfare in alternative
schemes. A systematic search was carried out over three of the policy vari-
ables, the income tax rate, the voucher taper rate and either the maximum
voucher or the social dividend, with the fourth policy variable being deter-
mined by the government’s budget constraint (which was solved iteratively
in view of the nonlinearity involved).
It was found that for all combinations, a uniform voucher turns out to be
optimal; that is, the optimal taper rate applied to the voucher is zero. The
optimal taper showed little sensitivity to the degree of inequality aversion
of the social welfare function. However, if a binding constraint is placed
on the maximum tax rate (and hence gross revenue) which can be imposed
by the government, means-testing is found to be optimal. However, the
resulting taper rate is relatively small, even if both the tax rate and the
maximum voucher are restricted. Although the paper has concentrated on
comparing alternative tax and transfer structures using an approach based
on the optimal tax literature and considering one generation of parents, it
would be of interest in future work to examine the implications for growth
and inequality in a multi-generational framework.
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